


István György Tóth The (Hungarian) Social Report 2022

Presentation at the **17th** Conference
on “Social Monitoring and Reporting in
Europe” 11 October 2023, Menaggio, Italy

OUTLINE

- The social report series
- The content of the current report
- Some of the main messages on the Hungarian society



SOCIAL REPORT 2022 – THE **17TH** IN THE SERIES

- 1990-2022, every second year
- Social indicators and analyses
- Empirical research reports
- International comparisons
- Users: administration, academia, media university students
- Finance: social integration and social policy secretariat in the Ministry of the Interior - not the welfare ministry (yet again...)
- By TARKI staff and (at least half) by other members of HU research community



Social Report 2022

Some figures about the volume:

- 33 years since the first Hungarian Social Report
- 17th volume: sounds like a record in Europe
- 26 No. of chapters
- 39 authors
- 18 women (46%)
- 70% 70 percent of the authors are not researchers at TÁRKI

Seven major thematic sections

- Economy
- Demography
- Social structure and mobility
- Social situation and inequalities
- Crises
- Political behaviour and attitudes
- Value structure

Economy

1. Economic policies (*Palócz Éva*)

- The economy weathered the real economic consequences of the Covid crisis well,
- **financial balance indicators** have deteriorated severely (budget deficit, public debt, external and balance of payments deficits, inflation, wrong forint exchange rate).
- The outlook depends on how the government can cope in a context of **increasing international isolation, and what the economic and social cost** will be.

2. EU funds: (*Medve-Bálint Gergő – Martin József Péter – Nagy Gabriella*)

longer-term impacts:

- an important role in **financing public investment**
- but have not substantially **reduced territorial disparities,**
- contributed only marginally to the **growth of economic activity**
- centralised resource allocation has also increased **corruption risks,**
- they have not strengthened **regional central and local government**

3. Minimum income benefits between 2009 and 2017

(Gábos András – Tomka Zsófia)

- reduced **social assistance adequacy** and
- significantly increased the **work incentive effect**
- this has **increased employment** among the low-educated and unskilled,
- However, during the recovery period (2014-2017), there seems to have been a **segment of society that has been left behind**, which for one reason or another has been unable to benefit from the employment growth.

4. House price trends *(Hegedüs József – Székely Judit)*

- Between 2001 and 2021, **housing price inequality** has increased more than income inequality.
- The **reevaluation of housing wealth** has now become the most important component of wealth inequality.
- The conclusion of the analysis is that the interaction between the positions in the economic development model and the allocation of public resources is likely to lead to the emergence of a **new municipal class structure**.

Demography

5. Social reproduction: fertility processes and family policy interventions

(Spéder Zsolt – Murinkó Lívía)

- The main changes in family policy institutions between the 1980s and 2010s had an impact on childbearing.
- While the Bokros package (1995) reduced the chances of becoming a parent, the introduction of full-time motherhood (1993) and the family tax allowance (1999) facilitated the birth of third children.
- Family policy measures have affected different social groups to different degrees. The economy weathered the real economic consequences of the Covid crisis well

6. The transformation and polarisation of mating patterns (Erát Dávid)

- Between 1980 and 2016, the proportion of women with higher education increased in line with the expansion of higher education, giving priority to hypogamous couples in which the woman's educational attainment is higher.
- However, these relationships are more fragile.
- Couples with two graduates are becoming more common, while the proportion of relationships between two people with no more than primary education is stagnating.
- This phenomenon may indicate a kind of polarisation through couple selection.

7. **Social inequalities of opportunity actually start at birth** (*Veroszta Zsuzsanna*)

- The chapter summarising the results of the first three waves of the Cohort'18 Hungarian Birth Cohort Study shows how the chances of a **child born in Hungary today vary greatly** in terms of birth circumstances, family situation, health, living conditions and the care received, depending on the status of the family in which it starts life.

Social structure and social mobility

8. The relationship between **income distribution and class structure** between 1982 and 2019 (*Huszár Ákos*)

- income inequalities between occupational groups **increased steadily until the first half of the 2010s**, and the share of income heterogeneity explained by occupational groups also increased.
- **By the end of the 2010s**, however, there was a marked reversal in the income gaps between occupational groups, as shown by the data from the KSH.
- (new research topic): what explains this?

9. **Intergenerational wealth transfers** (*Medgyesi Márton*)

- **inheritance and gifts received increase by seven percentage points** the probability of entering the top wealth quintile in Hungary,,
- this is - still today - **the weakest effect among the EU countries** in the analysis.
- Possible reason: **wealth accumulation in post-socialist countries started only about a generation ago** and the impact of wealth transfers is **still less visible**.

10. Partner selection and school mobility (*Erát Dávid – Huszár Ákos – Füzér Katalin*)

- there is a high degree of **intergenerational immobility** and **intergenerational homogamy** (pairing between people in similar situations).
- The combination of these two factors **creates a self-reinforcing process in which more and more people inherit their parents' situation and choose a partner of the same situation**, contributing to the further segmentation of Hungarian society.

11. A study on educational inequalities, school mobility and the transformation of the education system from the 1980s to the present (*Lőrincz Borbála – Antal-Fekete Emese*)

- the educational inequalities that existed before the **regime change have increased dramatically** since the 1990s, and the elite-friendly institution of free school choice has been entrenched.
- The weak egalitarian efforts of the 2000s **have been undone by the centralisation and conservative ideological turnaround after 2010.**
- Although **the number of school leavers and graduates increased during the period under review, the most vulnerable pupils were excluded from quality education.**

12. Inequalities in housing wealth (*Horváth Vera*)

- regional wealth inequalities within the country are increasing persistently, which in turn has a significant impact on **the housing, wealth accumulation and social mobility opportunities of the next generation.**

Social situation and inequalities

13. Trends in poverty over time (*Gábos András – Tátrai Annamária*) between 2005 and 2020, but especially since 2011.

- **around 20% of the total population live below the threshold of 70% of annual median equivalised income**
- The share of people living in poverty has fallen below **the 60% threshold** calculated according to the EU recommendation,
- the proportion of **people living in extreme poverty** (i.e. those with less than 40% of the median equivalised income) has increased in Hungarian society.

14. Spatial differences in poverty and deprivation (*Tátrai Annamária*):

- Survey for the first time at district level, linking administrative and survey data
- Hungary's poverty map, which shows poverty rates varying between **2% and 44% for income poverty** and between **8% and 56% for severe material deprivation**

15. *The situation of young people in European cities (Csathó Ábel – Medgyesi Márton)*

- **Higher economic development does not in itself** increase satisfaction, but through lower unemployment, better public services, better facilities and a more liveable urban environment.
- In the 2012-2019 period, the two **Hungarian cities with the lowest satisfaction with life among young people after Athens, Miskolc and Budapest, are far worse** than would be expected from the nature of the city-level characteristics.

Crises and social consequences

16. School closures due to the pandemic and the shift to digital education

(Lannert Judit)

- the negative consequences of the Covid pandemic will **be with us for a long time.**
- In the field of education, **the young generations are the ones who are losing out,**
- **almost a year of learning lost in Central and Eastern European** countries due to school closures caused by the Covid epidemic by spring 2021.
- The negative effects have been even **more severe for disadvantaged pupils,** as it is not only the lower quality of digital education in disadvantaged schools that has been a problem, but also the access to it.

17. Demographic characteristics of Covid mortality (*Bálint Lajos*)

- In 2021, life expectancy has **fallen dramatically** in all the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe except Slovenia, **but within this group, Hungary has among the lowest life expectancy losses.**
- **Such a shock is unprecedented in the seven decades following World War II.**
- Nearly two thirds of the loss in life expectancy was due to declining mortality in the population aged 60 and over, **but the loss in middle age was not negligible.**

18. The refugee consequences of the war in Ukraine (*Tóth Judit – Bernát Anikó*)

- **only 2% of the refugees who enter Hungary stay here**, the rest go on to other countries.
- Solidarity and care for refugees in need of protection has been **deliberately dismantled by the government** over the last ten years.
- Thus, **the help of NGOs and volunteers** in 2022 will demonstrate the remnants of humanity more spectacularly than the reorganisation of state bureaucracy and minimal services, which is not even preparing for the permanent stay and integration of refugees.

Elections, political preferences and political behaviours

19. Study analysing data from the **2022 parliamentary elections** (*Tóka Gábor*)

- provides a **more precise summary of the results** of the 2022 parliamentary elections than previously published,
- He argues that **from summer 2019 to April 2022, the pendulum swung** slightly between the popularity of the united opposition and the governing parties, but that the 2022 election can be largely inferred from the 2018 results
- The only real change was the strengthening of Mi Hazánk 2021-22.

20. **Nine elections in Hungary** (*Mészáros József – Pintér József – Ragács Attila – Syi*)

- while it was still an urban party according to its 1998 election data,
- already in 2002 a rather **strong negative correlation between Fidesz support and the size of the settlements** was established:
(i.e. Fidesz was considered a rural party from that time on)

21. Analysis of the **relationship between political participation and labour market presence** (*Róbert Péter – Susánszky Pál*)

- In almost all European countries, being unemployed or having a job with low autonomy significantly reduces political participation. Other disadvantages play a different role in employment.
- The relationships examined are stronger where political participation is higher (Northern and Western Europe);
- In Hungary, the link between political and labour market exclusion appears weaker due to the generally low participation rate.

22. The **East-West orientation** of the Hungarian population (Tóth István György)

- The Hungarian population is **basically pro-Western**.
- **The proportion of people with a positive opinion of the EU and the US has increased in the past, even in the period when anti-Western rhetoric in Hungarian domestic politics was intensifying.**
- However, in recent years, for various reasons, support for both transatlantic actors, China and Russia, has **declined**. Russia's has fallen the most, but the decline has also been significant for the US, the EU and China.
- Traditional socio-economic dimensions make it difficult to identify "Eastern" and "Western" social groups, but "pro-Russian" attitudes were **significantly more prevalent among pro-government voters than in the rest of the population.**

The value structure of society

23. Religiousness (*Máté-Tóth András – Rosta Gergely*)

- The decline in the number of people practising their religion regularly, at least monthly, seems to have stopped in the last ten years. From 23% of the population between 1991 and 2012, it fell to around 15% in 2012, but has since risen slightly.
- Hungary does not stand out from international trends in terms of regular religious practice and belief in God; it is one of the more secularised of the countries that have changed their regime.
- In the last decade, the influence of political religion has definitely become stronger - mainly because political responses to threats to society have relied heavily on a kind of Christian frame of reference.

24. Social attitudes towards homosexuality (*Takács Judit – Szalma Ivett*)

- comparative international research shows that Hungary is one of the **less accepting European countries**, but **Hungarian society as a whole is by no means homophobic**.
- Recent Hungarian data show that there is a **positive relationship between the acceptance of immigrants and the perception of gay and lesbian adoption** (but it is not possible to establish the causal relationship between the two).

25. Social attitudes towards the rights and participation of **people with disabilities** (*Bernát Anikó – Petri Gábor – Vajda Dorina – Kozma Ágnes*)

- among the adult Hungarian population in 2021 show that there is a high level of acceptance of people with motor and sensory disabilities, but a higher level of rejection of people with autism and intellectual disabilities in Hungarian society, which is largely consistent with available international data.
- This may be partly due to their relative "invisibility" compared to people with disabilities, blindness or hearing impairment and the resulting prejudice, and partly due to their very low access to services: they are marginalised from the education system and most are completely unserved in adulthood.

Predictions in retrospect

26. The final study of the volume reads and reinterprets an analysis of TÁRKI's analysis of the development of Hungarian society up to 2020, made at the time of EU accession. On this basis, it concludes that the 2004 **projection of social developments** in 2022 proved accurate in many respects. The most significant error was the failure to adopt the euro, and we did not foresee our marginalisation from the European integration process. (*Kolosi Tamás – Szelényi Iván*)



The book is available and can be downloaded from our website (www.tarki.hu) and is available in e-Book and audiobook format.

