

The sociological characteristics of the discourse on relocation quotas in Hungary¹

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Abstract

Our aim was to describe the main characteristics of the relocation quota discourse in Hungary between 2015 and 2018. This topic was from the very beginning highly politicized all over the EU, and in several countries, was used as the core issue for debating a much wider array of topics, such as sovereignty, and “more or less Europe.” As far as politicization of the refugee crisis is concerned, Hungary is an extreme case where the issue of relocation quotas became the ultimate propaganda tool of a moral panic generating technique, an essential element of which is the moral panic button (MPB).

Focusing on the subsample of articles that contain (at least once) the term “relocation quota” (N= 5684), we identified several signs that the relocation quota discourse was indeed the core topic of the MPB. For example, (1) the term migrant (and not refugee) with a more negative connotation was often used in the quota discourse, (2) in a media outlet in the course of being converted from a non-governmental source into a governmental one, the visibility of the main culprit of the refugee crisis (according to the official propaganda) George Soros, skyrocketed.

Keywords:

relocation quota, content analysis, Hungary, refugee crisis 2015, quota discourse, moral panic button

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Introduction

In the cross-national paper of WP5 (Pasetti and Garcés-Mascreñas, 2018) the authors argued that there are two fundamental questions one has to answer to solve the problem of the European migration crisis: How to distribute responsibility fairly, and how to harmonize standards on both asylum procedures and reception conditions. The WP5 participants agreed that in order to answer these two questions we need to fine tune our research design. The decision was made to focus on the discourse on relocation quotas since this was an issue relevant to all countries. We assumed that the topic of relocation quotas could be a proper proxy for such a comparative and empirical study since (1) there was an EU wide discussion on it (2) more or less during the same time period (3) based on an EU document as a common point of departure for the discourse. Moreover, this discourse was from the very beginning (1) highly politicized, and (2) in several cases even used as the core issue for debating a much wider array of topics, such as sovereignty, and “more or less Europe.” As the comparative analysis put it:

... the issue of the relocation quotas is framed in close connection with country-specific issues related to immigration. In other words, responsibility as a discursive-construct assumes country-specific acceptations. Sometimes, as it occurs in border countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain, it is understood as the responsibility for arrivals ... In other context responsibility is envisaged stressing its link with the challenges that a (supposed) increased diversity brings about in terms of social cohesion. (ibid p.9)

We argue that as far as this politicization process is concerned Hungary is an extreme case where the issue of relocation quotas became the ultimate propaganda tool of a moral panic (see Glossary) generating technique, an essential element of which is the moral panic button (from now on the MPB, see Glossary, see Bognár et al, 2018).

In this paper we first repeat the main findings of the comparative study (Pasetti and Garcés-Mascreñas, 2018) and of the Hungarian analysis of the salience of relocation quotas (Bognár et al, 2018), as if it were a pilot to our present paper. In Chapter 2 we summarize our analysis on the prevalence and content of the discourse on the migration crisis in Hungary (Sik-Simonovits, 2019). Chapter 3 contains the basic features of the discourse on relocation quotas (from now on “the quota”), comparing in what ways it is similar to or different from the general discourse on the migration crisis. Chapter 4 focuses on the clusters (see Glossary) which emerge from the quota discourse. In Chapter 5 we illustrate some associations between the quota discourse and the MPB approach. Finally, Chapter 6 contains our conclusions.

However, before we start our analysis it is unavoidable to explain why we use the term “migration crisis” throughout the paper instead of other alternatives², and most of all “refugee crisis.” The problem is that whichever term we decide to use we immediately enter into the labelling debate, as our use of “refugee” instead of “migrant” (or vice versa) will be interpreted by many readers as making a political statement. We would therefore like to stress that our use of the term “migration crisis” should not be seen as a political statement (i.e. we do not mean to imply that those who came were NOT refugees). We are using both the terms “migrant” and “migration” in a purely technical, neutral sense.³


2 We avoid using the vague term „mixed flow,” created by IOM (IOM (2009), IOM (2015)).

3 Of course whether the terms “migrant” and “migration” are indeed neutral terms depends on the context. In case of Hungary, for example, these terms are NOT neutral but have negative connotations of “being foreign” and are often used in contrast to “refugee” which has positive connotations (i.e. people who need and deserve charity and help).

1. The prevalence of the quota discourse

In the comparative analysis Pasetti and Garcés-Mascareñas (2018) showed that there was a short period (from late August to early October 2015, i.e. when the migration crisis culminated) when the prevalence of the quota discourse was extremely high in all eight countries (Figure 1).

Figure 1 The salience of the quota discourse in eight countries⁴ (8 May 2015 – 30 November 2015)



Quota related EU-level events: Blue arrow - 13/05/2015 European Agenda on Migration (the possibility of a relocation quota is referred to), Red arrow - 26/06/2015 European Council (relocation of 40,000 refugees from Greece and Italy), Green - 22/09/2015 European Council agreement (relocation 120,000 refugees from Greece and Italy).

Except for Italy, the first two top-down EU-level events on relocation are not associated with high salience. The quota discourse became salient only when the intensity of the refugee movement on the Balkan route reached the core areas of the EU. This was also the time of the third top-down EU action, but it is unlikely that this caused the increasing prevalence of the general discourse on the migration crisis—more likely it only overlapped with it. As the comparative analysis very lucidly put it:

Two different dynamics seem to lie beyond the tendency of increasing prevalence, one related to the power of the media and the other linked to that of the government. The case of Finland well describes the former: here the increasing prevalence about the refugee matter does not take place at the same time in media and in the parliament. Whereas the parliamentary debates on the relocation quota took place behind the cabinet's closed doors, media debates plainly addressed the matter, thus not only contributing to a growing relevance for the public but also spreading a specific framing. The case of Hungary instead captures the second type of dynamic, in which prevalence of the issue is driven by political discourse. ... high level of prevalence is due to the unique role played by the government. ... What seems to matter most ... is the incidence of far-right parties... in all the countries where such type of party


⁴ The horizontal axis contains the weeks between 7 May to 30 November 2015—the vertical axis shows the number of quota-related articles, which is significantly (at least twice) higher than the country-specific average number of articles during the entire period.

is found, the issue of responsibility vis-à-vis refugee and immigration-related matters became a salient topic both in the public and political agenda.” (Pasetti- Garcés-Mascareñas 2018, p. 18)

We do not know exactly what the country-specific explanations for the salience of the quota discourse before (Italy) and after (Greece, Hungary and Turkey) the common high-salience autumn period are, but in the following analysis we will argue that in case of Hungary the MPB significantly contributed to the salience of the quota discourse. The three high-salience weeks in Hungary overlapped with the intensification of using the MPB: finishing the building the fence on the Croatian border, and starting the campaign for the quota referendum.

As to the detailed analysis of the prevalence of the quota debate in Hungary (Bognár et al, 2018), the number of articles mentioning the quota between 1 May and 31 November 2015 shows (Figure 2) that the topic became relevant only in early September, i.e. the first two EU-level quota related decisions did not capture the attention of the Hungarian media. This may be due to a combination of several factors: the behavior of the news-oriented commercial media (to which EU communication is not interesting enough), and the intention of the government-controlled media to minimize information originating directly from the EU, i.e. information that is presented not properly tailored to the government’s communication frame.

Figure 2 Weekly frequency of relocation quota-related articles between 1 January 2015 and 31 November 2015




Notes: N = 356, weekly average (red line) – 11.7.

Quota related EU-level events: Blue arrow - 13/05/2015 European Agenda on Migration (the possibility of a relocation quota is referred to), Red arrow - 26/06/2015 European Council (relocation of 40,000 refugees from Greece and Italy), Green - 22/09/2015 European Council agreement (relocation 120,000 refugees from Greece and Italy). HU events (green arrow): 4 November 2015 – Fidesz starts collecting signatures against the quotas. Both (brown): 22 September 2015 – refugees clash with police at the border (Röszke).

Another dataset which covers the same period (Balog et al, 2016), reinforces our findings (Figure 3).

Figure 3 The daily number of quota related articles between 1 May and 31 November 2015 (N/day)



Source: Balog et al, 2016, random sample from 25 Hungarian online sources, N=357, the horizontal axis shows the number of days (i.e. 1= 1 May, 211= 30 November).

Before early September 2015 the number of quota related articles was low. The first high-salience day was on the first week of September (days around No. 121-127), which obviously had nothing to do with the EU relocation related declarations but rather with the events on the Hungarian-Serbian border (Appendix Table A1 and Figure A1). If we smooth out the following daily oscillations, the result resembles the results in Figure 2: the quota related articles remain more frequent compared to earlier times, which means the quota related discourse as part of the politicized propaganda was maintained by the repeated pressing of the MPB.

2. Briefly about the research design and the dataset

In this Chapter we briefly summarize elements of our research design and characteristics of the dataset that might be useful for the Reader.⁵ We selected ten **sources** to represent the Hungarian online media in four dimensions such as (1) the type of source (online version of a print newspaper versus an online site), (2) their relation to the government (pro-government and non-governmental), and (3) their political attitude (only among the non-governmental sources: right-wing/radical versus moderate/left-wing). And last but not least, (4) we wanted to maximize the coverage of the online audience.

The five media with the largest audience consists of four non-governmental media (index.hu, 24.hu, 444.hu and atv.hu) and one governmental media outlet (origo.hu) which used to be also non-governmental before its nationalization in 2017 (see Chapter 5). The other five sources consist of three right-wing and two leftist online media outlets with a smaller but very active audience (alfahir.hu, pestisracok.hu, magyaridok.hu and nepszava.hu, and nepszabadsag.hu). The last medium, however, does not exist anymore but used to have the largest audience during most of the time of our research (until 8 October 2016 when it was forced to go out of business).

In the typology of the media outlets (see Figure 6 and onward) on the left side there are the three governmental sources (origo.hu, magyaridok.hu and pestisracok.hu) and one right-wing non-governmental site (alfahir.hu, which represents a radical right wing party (Jobbik) with as anti-migrant attitudes as the governmental media outlets), on the right side the five non-governmental sources.

⁵ For a more detailed discussion see (Sik-Simonovits, 2019).

Since we wanted to describe the main characteristics of the media discourse in Hungary during the migration crisis, we had to define the **starting** and (if there was) the **ending dates** of the migration crisis. As to the former, we started our analysis on 1 January 2015. Not because it was the beginning of the calendar year but because according to the results of a case study (Bernát-Messing, 2016) the Hungarian Prime Minister gave several interviews between January 7 and 11, by which time the discourse on the migration crisis had started. We assume that this was also the first instance of pressing the MPB by the government to increase their popularity, which had been rapidly decreasing since late 2014 (Sik, 2016, Barlai-Sik, 2016).

The ending date of the time-span of our research has been derived from our assumption that the MPB is a long-term form of state propaganda: as the discourse on the migration crisis did not end with the disappearance of migrants, we decided to extend our research period to cover the Parliamentary elections of 2018.

We also defined shorter periods within this time-span which—according to the available qualitative observations—could be identified as separate instances of pressing the MPB (Table 1). The idea was to set the exact date of campaign events on the basis of identifying their (1) starting and (2) culminating points, when the MPB was pressed. The general idea was to start the selection of the relevant articles some time before and some time after the culmination point.

Table 1 The observation periods in our focus

	7 January - 4 February 2015 (4 weeks)	15 April – 31 November 2015 (ca 30 weeks)	11 September – 9 October 2016 (4 weeks)	28 March - 1 June 2017 (ca 9 weeks)	10 November – 8 December 2017 (4 weeks)	17 January – 20 February 2018 (ca 5 weeks)	201 March – 15 April 2018 (ca 6 weeks)
	Orbán’s first anti-migration statements	The peak period of the migration crisis including a national consultation on terrorism and immigration	The relocation quota referendum	National consultation (“Stop Brussels!”)	National consultation (“The Soros Plan”)	The “Stop Soros!” campaign	Parliamentary elections (and the anti-UN campaign)
starting point	9 January	???	24 February	26 March	14 September	17 January	Mid-March
culmination	11-18 January	5 May	2 October	April-May 2017	October 2017	4-10 February	8 April


To find the articles that were likely to contain the relevant information, we defined four keywords (“menekül...” “bevándor...” “migrá...” “betelepít...”) and selected articles that contained at least one of these keywords. The keywords were constructed to identify the Hungarian equivalents of the following terms: “refugee,” “immigrant,” “migrant,” and “relocation.”

3. Some characteristics of the discourse on relocation quotas

In the first section we analyze similarities and differences between the quota discourse and the discourse on the migration crisis in the total corpus (Sik-Simonovits, 2019).

Comparing the frequency of articles between 1 January 2015 and 14 April 2018 (Figure 4), we found that—despite the very different number of articles—the trends are rather similar.


Figure 4 The prevalence of the all articles and *quota related* articles in the corpus by event-specific periods (all articles = number articles/100, quota related articles = number of articles, N=45875)



This fits our assumption that in Hungary the quota discourse is embedded into the general discourse on migration issues.

Comparing the prevalence of the term “quota” to the two most often used labels in the corpus (Figure 5) we find that this term was always less often used than the two labels.


Figure 5 The prevalence of the term “quota” compared to the terms “refugee” and “migrant” in the corpus by period decile (% of articles)



The period when it reached the highest prevalence was when four instances of pressing the MPB (the quota referendum and the three national consultations, “Stop Brussels,” “The Soros Plan,” and “Stop Soros”), from late 2016 to mid-2018 occurred.

Unlike the two politically sensitive labels, the prevalence of *quota* is rather similar in the government controlled outlets and the non-governmental sources (Figure 6).


Figure 6 The prevalence of the term “quota” compared to the two most often used labels in the corpus by source (% of articles, governmental sources on the left, non-governmental sources on the right)



In the second section we work with the subsample of articles that contain (at least once) the term “relocation quota” (N= 5684). We focus on the deviations (if any) between the content of the relocation quota discourse and the migration crisis discourse in general.

Figure 7 shows that in the quota subsample the prevalence of all labels is much higher than in the corpus but their ranking order is similar—except for the prevalence of the three migration related ones, labels do not differ.


Figure 7 The prevalence of the five most often used labels in the total sample and in the quota subsample (% of articles)



There are greater differences if we concentrate on the rate between the prevalence in the quota subsample versus the corpus: while the label refugee is 1.12 times more prevalent in the quota subsample, the rate of the labels migration, immigrant, migrant and immigration is significantly higher (1.71, 1.44, 1.35 and 1.32) respectively. A stronger association between migration related terms and the quota discourse can be a sign that these terms with negative connotation are related to the MPB.


As to the trend of prevalence of the two main actors (Figure 8), Orbán’s visibility in the quota subsample is always higher than in the corpus but without a different trend. Neither in the corpus nor in the quota subsample is Soros mentioned before 2016, but in 2018 his visibility rises significantly faster in the quota subsample than in the corpus. This is a clear sign that the quota discourse and “Soros” were intentionally connected to each other in this period. As such an association cannot occur by chance, we consider this as a proof of operating the MPB.

Figure 8 The prevalence of the two main actors in the corpus and in the quota subsample by period decile (% of articles)



As for the prevalence of the main actors by source (Figure 9), the quota subsample is more focused on Orbán than the corpus in all sources (especially by alfahir.hu and index.hu) but there is no clear difference between the non-governmental and the governmental groups.

Figure 9 The prevalence of the two main actors in the corpus and quota subsample by source (% of articles)




In the case of Soros, however, both in the corpus and in the quota subsample the sources in the governmental group give a significantly higher level of visibility to Soros than in the other group, and in most cases the rate is also larger.⁶

As to organizations (Figure 10), while there is no difference between the corpus and the quota subsample as far as neutral actors (MTI, the public news agency of Hungary and the UN) are concerned, the prevalence of all three political parties is much higher in the quota subsample, though their ranking order remains unchanged.


⁶ The case of NOL should be treated separately since by the time the anti-Soros campaign started, NOL ceased to exist.

Figure 10 The prevalence of the main organizations in the corpus and in the quota subsample (% of articles)



The most often used negative term “illegal”⁷ was used more frequently in the quota subsample than in the corpus during two periods (and not for long): first during the campaign of the national consultation on immigration and terrorism, and second during the later anti-Soros and anti-EU campaigns (Figure 11).

Figure 11 The prevalence of the most often used negative term (“illegal”) in the corpus and in the quota subsample by period decile (% of articles)



7 The term “illegal” was usually used as the epithet accompanying “migration” and “migrant.”

4. Clusters of the quota discourse

In this Chapter we analyze the association among the different dimensions of the quota discourse. First with correlation, later using a simplified version of cluster analysis⁸, we illustrate the types of associations among the labels, actors, and organizations (but remaining always within a given dimension), and how the clusters are connected to other characteristics of the articles. We will use the total sample (corpus) as the benchmark, and repeat the cluster analysis using the quota subsample twice, first on a four-cluster model and then on a ten-cluster model. The aim is (1) to test whether there are differences in the clustering processes between the corpus and the quota sub-sample, and (2) to identify special clusters within the quota subsample that significantly differ from the general structure of the quota discourse.

When analyzing the **correlation** between the labels (Table 2) we find only one strong negative correlation: between the terms “refugee” and “immigration.” In other words, if an article uses the term “refugee,” it is unlikely to use the term “immigration” as well.

Table 2 The correlation among labels in the quota subsample (N=5684, Pearson coefficients)

	Refugee	Immigration	Immigrant	Migrant	Migration	Asylum seeker	Refugee crisis
Refugee	x						
Immigration	-0.08**	x					
Immigrant		0.31**	x				
Migrant		0.08**	0.16**	x			
Migration		0.13**	0.11**	0.16**	x		
Asylum seeker	0.22**				0.08**	x	
Refugee crisis	0.29**					0.16**	x
Refugee system	0.36**				0.06**	0.24**	0.16**

8 The technique is called quick cluster (K-means) and is used only (together with principal component analysis) to get a first glimpse of the combinations of the target variables. For more detail, see: https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSLVMB_24.0.0/spss/base/syn_quick_cluster_overview.html

** The coefficient is significant at p=0.0000 level.

We expected that the *migration* versus *refugee* group variants of the term *migration* and *refugee* are positively correlated to each other, and negatively correlated to those in the other group. The results of the correlation analysis only partially backed up our assumptions: (1) while the within-group correlations are relatively strong, (2) there are no negative correlations between the two groups of labels (except for the earlier mentioned case), and (3) the term “migrant” is positively correlated with two—relatively rarely used—*refugee* related terms.

Using the analysis as a benchmark, the following cluster analysis focuses on the **actors in the corpus**. Table 3 contains three small actor clusters. They differ from the rest of the sample in some ways, while differing from each other as well:

Table 3 The actor clusters in the corpus (N=45875, four-cluster version)

Orbán as ...	international actor (C1)	Prime Minister (C2)	head of foreign affairs (C3)	Corpus
N	759	414	1816	45875
Main actors	Merkel, Orbán (Putyin)	Lázár, Orbán, Rogán (Kósa, Pintér)	Orbán (Szijjártó, Lázár, Juncker)	
Main actors (%)				
Merkel	94	4	16	6
Orbán	82	91	94	23
Soros	2	11	1	6
Sources (%)				
origo	9	6	10	9
pestisracok	6	4	6	7
alfahir	2	5	4	8
magyaridok	19	11	15	21
index	13	16	11	9
24	7	6	8	10
444	6	7	7	9
atv	10	12	9	9
nepszava	12	24	18	10
nol	16	9	12	8
Labels (%)				

refugee	76	68	72	58
refugee crisis	21	11	18	8
refugee system	22	26	24	13
asylum seeker	18	12	14	11
immigration	39	49	43	27
immigrant	29	46	40	31
migrant	42	53	43	37
migration	36	35	37	24
quota	24	28	31	12
Hungarian political parties (%)				
Fidesz	19	81	30	19
Jobbik	6	31	10	6
Mszp	4	30	10	6
The length of the articles (deciles)				
1	0	0	2	7
2	3	1	3	10
3	4	2	6	11
4	5	3	6	11
5	4	5	7	9
6	8	4	8	10
7	8	5	9	9
8	14	15	14	11
9	21	18	17	11
10	33	47	28	11

- The common elements in all three clusters are as follows:
 - o Orbán has a strong presence in all three clusters⁹ but they identify him in different roles: in the first cluster he is one of the major international players, in the second he is the head of the


⁹ This is well illustrated in the first block in Table 3 which also shows that Orbán is present in almost all articles belonging to the three clusters—though coming in only second in the first cluster after Merkel.

government, and in the third and largest cluster he acts as the leading figure of Hungarian foreign policy.

- Almost all labels are overrepresented in all three clusters, which is likely a by-product of the articles being longer than the average (especially in C2).
- The differences between the three clusters are as follows:
 - Orbán as an international actor (C1) is underrepresented in alfahir.hu and overrepresented in nol.hu. These sources belong to the non-governmental group, but while the former is a right-wing oriented one focusing mostly on domestic politics, the latter used to be a source with international interest, even stationing correspondents abroad,
 - C2 and C3 are underrepresented in governmental sources and overrepresented in nepszava.hu, and unsurprisingly C2 (in which cluster Orbán is the head of the government) is very strongly (C3 less so) overrepresented in domestic politics (with Fidesz in the core).

As to the trend of their prevalence (Figure 12), all three clusters are relatively more visible during the mid-part and less visible by the end of the time-span. C2 (with Orbán as Prime Minister in the core) is characterized, however, by a somewhat different trend: it is especially prevalent at the beginning of the time-span (before the peak of the migration crisis), i.e. when the MPB was being tested.

Figure 12 The prevalence of clusters of actors in the total sample by period (% of articles)



Attempting to identify actor clusters in the quota subsample using only the four-cluster version (Table 4) was not very successful since only two clusters were identified, and even they resembled those that were already in the corpus, i.e. we have not gained any new knowledge. In both clusters Orbán was among the main actors but while in C1 he shared his position with other European politicians, he alone dominated C2.

Table 4 The actor clusters in the quota subsample (N=5684, four-cluster version)¹⁰

Orbán as ...	international actor (C1)	head of foreign affairs (C2)	Total sub-sample
N	154	479	5684
Main actors	Merkel, Juncker, Tusk, Orbán (Cameron)	Orbán (Szijjártó, Juncker, Kósa)	
Main actors (%)			
Merkel	73	7	9
Orbán	66	94	45
Soros	1	2	11
Hungarian political parties (%)			
Fidesz	18	53	36
Jobbik	9	25	15
Mszp	9	25	13
Sources (%)			
origo	8	9	10
pestisracok	5	5	9
alfahir	4	6	7
magyaridok	18	14	27
index	7	11	8
24	5	7	7
444	9	6	5
atv	7	8	7
nepszava	21	21	10
nol	16	13	10
Labels (%)			


¹⁰ Cluster variables: core actors (above 0.60), additional actors (above 0.30)

refugee	90	75	66
asylum seeker	33	16	16
refugee system	38	25	20
refugee crisis	41	23	14
immigration	50	41	41
immigrant	49	38	39
migrant	58	49	50
migration	54	43	41
The length of the articles (deciles)			
1	0	1	2
2	2	2	5
3	1	5	7
4	4	5	8
5	6	7	9
6	6	7	11
7	5	9	12
8	14	12	13
9	21	21	15
10	41	31	18

As to the main characteristics of these two clusters: social democratic or socialist sources (nepszava.hu, nol.hu) are overrepresented, the articles are longer than average and the number of labels they contain is higher than average (especially C1 and particularly variants of the term “refugee”) in both clusters. As it fits their “division of labor,” while C1 hardly refers to Hungarian political parties at all, in C2 they are very visible.

The trend of the two clusters are rather similar during the time-span of the research (Figure 13). While C1 is particularly prevalent during the peak of the refugee crisis (early September 2015), C2 has a more extend presence in 2017/2018 when the MPB (obviously for “domestic use”) was pressed several times.

Figure 13 The prevalence of clusters of actors in the quota subsample by period decile (four-cluster version, % of articles)



To get a more detailed structure of the actor clusters in the quota subsample, we used a model which identified ten clusters. The result was four small clusters (Table 5), some rather similar to that of the previous ones, but one (and a relatively large one, C2) was completely new.

Table 5 The clusters of actors in the quota subsample (N=5684, ten-cluster version)¹¹

	EU (C1)	Soros (C2)	International (C3)	Domestic (C4)	Total sub-sample
N	151	824	229	144	5684
Main actors	Merkel, Tusk, Juncker, Orbán (Lázár)	Soros (Juncker, Orbán)	Merkel, Orbán (Putyin)	Orbán, Lázár, Rogán (Szijjártó, Kósa)	Total
Main actors (%)					
Merkel	66	2	69	5	9
Orbán	97	47	93	97	45
Soros	6	68	4	8	11
Hungarian political parties					
Fidesz	33	52	28	80	36
Jobbik	15	21	12	36	15
Mszp	16	20	10	38	13

¹¹ Cluster variables: core actors (above 0.60), additional actors (above 0.30)

Sources (%)					
origo	10	13	8	10	10
pestisracok	6	15	7	6	9
alfahir	3	6	23	5	7
magyaridok	11	33	4	9	27
index	10	7	12	12	8
24	3	6	7	3	7
444	8	2	7	6	5
atv	10	5	10	11	7
nepszava	26	9	14	25	10
nol	13	4	8	13	10
Labels (%)					
refugee	87	56	91	67	66
asylum seeker	34	15	25	17	16
refugee crisis	39	8	44	13	14
refugee system	40	19	32	26	20
immigration	57	54	47	62	41
immigrant	57	47	34	57	39
migrant	65	59	56	60	50
migration	60	52	43	49	41
The length of the articles (deciles)					
1	0	1	0	0	2
2	0	2	0	1	5
3	1	6	2	3	7
4	1	7	3	1	8
5	3	7	4	3	9
6	5	11	7	2	11
7	1	11	5	4	12
8	7	14	12	11	13
9	21	18	30	18	15


10	61	23	37	57	18
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The main characteristics of the four clusters are as follows:

- The main actors in the two international clusters (C1 and C3) are Orbán and Merkel. The articles in both international clusters (especially in C1) are long, and in association with this the prevalence of almost all labels is significantly above the average.
- In the Soros cluster (C2) Soros is the main actor, but Orbán’s visibility is not far from his. Three of the four governmental sources—especially the one directly responsible for state propaganda (magyaridok.hu)—are overrepresented, and the articles are relatively shorter than the average. These two features of the cluster can be related to the dominance of repetitive and short anti-Soros slogans the MPB usually applies. This explanation is supported by the fact that the labels “refugee” and “refugee crisis” are underrepresented in the articles, as if their association with Soros as part of the quota discourse had been intentionally hindered (“illegal migration” being the preferable label of the MPB). Finally, the Soros cluster—as it fits the MPB cluster focusing on domestic politics—refers to all Hungarian political parties above the average.
- The domestic cluster (C4) resembles its twin in the corpus (Table 3): the socialist nepszava.hu (and to a smaller extent index.hu) are overrepresented, and the official propaganda source (magyaridok.hu) is underrepresented. Very long articles, migration related labels, and the Hungarian political parties are overrepresented.

As to the trend of prevalence, the Soros cluster (C2) deviates from the other three clusters (Figure 14). It culminates in 2017/2018 when the MPB used Soros as the main culprit in various capacities (speculator, importer of immigrants, financing anti-Hungarian NGOs and the CEU, etc.).

Figure 14 The prevalence of clusters of actors in the quota subsample by period deciles (from ten clusters, % of articles)



As a benchmark to the analysis of the organization clusters of the quota subsample, we first analyzed the corpus. The result of the cluster analysis was a relatively big domestic cluster and a small international cluster (Table 6). While the former contained articles focusing on Hungarian political parties, first of all on Fidesz, the second contained articles focusing mainly on EU institutions and Hungarian governmental sources.

Table 6 The clusters of organizations in the corpus (N=45875, four clusters)¹²

	Domestic (C1)	International (C3)	Corpus
N	2118	190	45875
Main organizations	Fidesz, Jobbik (Brussels, Schengen, Mszp, LMP, DK)	Brussels, Schengen, MTI, TV2 (UN, Jobbik)	
Hungarian political parties (%)			
Fidesz	96	25	19
Jobbik	76	4	6
Mszp	53	4	6
Main actors (%)			
Merkel	3	21	6

¹² Cluster variables: core actors (above 0.60), additional actors (above 0.30)


Orbán	60	68	23
Soros	20	14	6
Sources (%)			
origo	6	4	9
pestisracok	13	25	7
alfahir	10	1	8
magyaridok	21	25	21
index	11	7	9
24	7	7	10
444	4	3	9
atv	10	8	9
nepszava	11	13	10
nol	5	7	8
Labels (%)			
refugee	44	64	58
asylum seeker	8	21	11
refugee system	13	36	13
refugee crisis	6	22	8
immigration	49	56	27
immigrant	39	55	31
migrant	48	62	37
migration	36	64	24
quota	32	46	12
The length of the articles (deciles)			
1	10	0	7
2	8	4	10
3	4	5	11
4	4	12	11
5	5	20	9
6	4	13	10

7	10	12	9
8	17	9	11
9	15	13	11
10	24	12	11

The only significant difference between the two clusters is that while *migration* and *quota* related labels are overrepresented in the rather lengthy articles in the domestic politics cluster (C1), in the international cluster (C2) all labels are overrepresented (despite the fact that these articles are not particularly long).

The two clusters (Figure 15) have opposite trends: while the domestic politics cluster has a U-shape with a fast increase after 2016 (very likely containing articles with heavy ammunition for the MPB), the international cluster reaches a peak in late autumn 2015.

Figure 15 The prevalence of clusters of organizations in the total sample by period decile (% of articles)



The model to identify the organization clusters in the quota subsample (Table 7) was very successful: it splits the subsample into three clusters containing practically all the articles. Two of them are large: C1 focusing on the EU, and C3 focusing on Fidesz. The smaller cluster (C2) has the Hungarian political parties in focus.

Table 7 The organization clusters in the quota subsample (N=5684, four clusters)¹³

	EU (C1)	Hungarian politics (C2)	Fidesz (C3)	Total sub-sample
N	2317	704	2661	5684
Main organization	Brussels (MTI)	Fidesz, Jobbik Mszp (Brussels, opposition, LMP, DK)	Fidesz (Brussels)	
Hungarian political parties (%)				
Fidesz	11	91	44	36
Jobbik	5	73	9	15
Mszp	5	72	6	13
Main actors (%)				
Merkel	9	4	10	9
Orbán	41	63	44	45
Soros	9	24	9	11
Sources (%)				
origo	10	10	9	10
pestisracok	16	10	5	9
alfahir	2	11	8	7
magyaridok	29	24	27	27
index	7	11	8	8
24	7	5	6	7
444	5	3	6	5
atv	6	8	7	7
nepszava	9	12	13	10
nol	9	6	11	10
Labels (%)				
refugee	68	53	67	66

13 Cluster variables: core actors (above 0.60), additional actors (above 0.30)


asylum seeker	19	10	16	16
refugee crisis	16	10	14	14
refugee system	24	15	18	20
immigration	40	52	39	41
immigrant	40	46	37	39
migrant	50	57	48	50
migration	46	45	36	41
The length of the articles (deciles)				
1	2	0	3	2
2	5	1	6	5
3	7	3	8	7
4	8	5	9	8
5	9	4	9	9
6	12	7	11	11
7	11	11	10	12
8	14	12	13	13
9	15	21	15	15
10	17	36	16	18

Rather similarly to that of the corpus, the composition of the sources does not deviate from the average in the quota subsample.

Neither in the EU cluster (C1) nor in the Fidesz cluster (C3) do labels deviate significantly from the average. As to the domestic politics cluster (C2), though the articles in this cluster are relatively longer than the average, while the label “refugee” and its related terms are significantly underrepresented, all *migration* related terms are overrepresented, and the presence of “Soros” is much stronger. This again proves that this is a cluster of articles that combines domestic politics and the MPB techniques within the quota discourse.

There is no major deviation between the trends of the three clusters (Figure 16): they are characterized by a smaller wave in the autumn of 2015, and much bigger one in 2017.

Figure 16 The prevalence of organization clusters in the quota subsample by period (from four clusters, % of articles)



If we experiment with a **more detailed organization clustering in the quota subsample** (Table 8), we can identify five clusters which covering all the articles. C1 can be considered as the benchmark of the analysis because of its size (it contains 56% of all the articles). The other clusters are much smaller and contain different combinations of organizations participating in the quota discourse.

Table 8 The organization clusters in the quota subsample (N=5684, ten clusters)¹⁴

	Benchmark (C1)	German politics (C2)	Border/terror (C3)	Hungarian politics (C4)	Neutral (C5)	Total sub-sample
N	3159	160	139	754	1357	5684
Main organization	Brussels (Schengen, Fidesz)	CDU, CSU (European People's Party, Fidesz, MTI)	Schengen, ISIS, Fidesz (Brussels, MTI)	Fidesz, Jobbik, Mszp (LMP)	MTI (Brussels, V4)	
Hungarian political parties (%)						
Fidesz	35	29	6	78	16	36
Jobbik	6	1	2	70	6	15
Mszp	7	1	1	58	4	13
Main actors (%)						
Merkel	7	43	14	3	10	9

¹⁴ Cluster variables: core actors (above 0.60), additional actors (above 0.30)

Orbán	41	46	43	58	44	45
Soros	10	4	3	17	10	11
Sources (%)						
origo	11	8	7	10	7	10
pestisracok	5	10	11	8	23	9
alfahir	7	3	3	14	4	7
magyaridok	30	31	26	19	22	27
index	6	15	9	12	7	8
24	7	8	6	5	7	7
444	4	3	5	5	7	5
atv	7	7	5	8	7	7
nepszava	13	9	13	9	9	10
nol	10	6	15	10	7	10
Labels (%)						
refugee	65	86	89	54	68	66
asylum seeker	16	34	34	9	15	16
refugee crisis	13	41	33	9	14	14
refugee system	18	40	54	11	21	20
immigration	38	49	49	42	43	41
immigrant	36	32	44	40	43	39
migrant	50	41	62	52	46	50
migration	39	39	64	38	45	41
The length of the articles (deciles)						
1	3	0	0	1	2	2
2	5	2	3	4	5	5
3	9	6	1	5	7	7
4	10	5	1	5	9	8
5	8	5	3	6	11	9
6	12	6	6	8	11	11
7	11	7	6	11	11	12


8	13	16	16	13	14	13
9	14	32	26	18	15	15
10	15	21	38	29	15	18

The prevalence of sources does not deviate significantly from the average in general. There are, however, individual deviations that are likely only due to the work of the editorial board. As to more relevant differences:

- In the German politics cluster (C2) the only articles that are significantly overrepresented are the ones using the term *refugee* (and terms related to it), i.e. this cluster is a selection of EU-compatible articles.
- The Hungarian politics cluster (C4) has a rather substantial share of long articles, but is still characterized by a lower than average share of *refugee* related labels. This is a telling sign of the effect of the MPB—tailored to domestic use—as well as the fact that Soros as a core actor is overrepresented only in this cluster.

The prevalence of the five clusters is rather similar during the entire period (Figure 17) except for the border/terror cluster (C3)—which is highly salient during the autumn of 2015 (during which time the migration crisis culminated, and the MPB was first used via the national consultation on immigration and terror)—and except for the temporary increase of the domestic cluster (C4) and the benchmark cluster (C1) around 2017 when the MPB was in full use.

Figure 17 The prevalence of organization clusters in the quota subsample by period decile (from ten clusters, % of articles)




5. The quota discourse and the MPB

During the time-span of the research two significantly different periods can be isolated: one before and one after the building of the border fence (September 2015). This is because while during the pre-fence period there were large numbers of refugees in Hungary and they were made visible to the public by the then still existing more independent sources, in the post-fence period the refugees were no longer present, and no strong non-governmental media existed anymore. In other words while in the pre-fence period (1) because of the visibility of refugees (Boda-Simonovits, 2016) and (2) because of the existence of a more polemical and informative media, the operation of the MPB was somewhat tempered, the balancing effects of these disappeared (or were significantly weakened) in the post-fence period.¹⁵ Consequently we assumed that the previously identified effects of the MPB will be more visible in the latter period compared to the former one. To illustrate the relevance of these assumptions, we defined two periods: an early one (between 7 January 2015 to 16 September 2015, -4 indicating the first four deciles), and a late one (after 2016, 7- indicating the last four deciles).

The sharp decrease in the use of the term “refugee” (and the almost as sharp increase in the use of the term “migrant”) can be related to repeated instances of pressing the MPB (Figure 18). And since the decrease in the use of the term “refugee” was especially fast in case of the quota discourse, we can conclude that articles focusing on the quota especially rigorously avoided using the term “refugee” as one with potential connotation of solidarity and altruism.


Figure 18 The prevalence of main labels in the first and last aggregated periods in corpus and the quota subsample



In the context of the increased use of the quota discourse for domestic political gains it is unsurprising that the prevalence of “Fidesz” increased during the last (7- deciles) period faster than in the general discourse (Figure 19).


¹⁵ During these weeks the level of xenophobia, which has been increasing fast since 2014, has decreased (Sik, 2016).

Figure 19 The prevalence of “Fidesz” in the first and last aggregated periods in the corpus and the quota subsample




As Figure 20 shows, the cluster containing articles focusing on Soros (C2) is the only cluster with a significant difference between the two periods. In the last (7- deciles) period, when the MPB was pressed several times, the prevalence of this cluster skyrocketed.

Figure 20 The prevalence of actor clusters (ten clusters) in the first and last aggregated periods




As to the trend of prevalence of the five organization clusters (Figure 21), while in the last aggregated period the prevalence of the domestic politics cluster (C4), and to a lesser degree the benchmark cluster (C1), increased, all other clusters, but especially the neutral one (C5), decreased.

Figure 21 The prevalence of organization clusters (ten) in the first and last aggregated periods




In another paper (Sik-Simonovits, 2019) we introduced a *natural experiment* (see Glossary), when the ownership of one of our sources (**origo.hu**) changed. In the beginning of our research time period it was a non-governmental source, but by the end of the period it became a governmental one. If we analyze the prevalence of the two most often used labels in the corpus and in the quota subsample (Figure 22), we find only one significant change: in the course of the organizational shift the use of the label “refugee” decreased more sharply in the quota subsample than in the corpus. In other words, the use of the term “refugee” when the topic is the quota was especially severely restricted after the government’s takeover. This can be interpreted as a lucid illustration of pressing the MPB.

Figure 22 The prevalence of the two main labels in the corpus and quota subsample by the lifecycle of origo.hu (% of articles)



Another telling example of the discursive shift in the course of making a subservient state-dominated puppet out of the previously non-governmental origo.hu, is the change in the visibility of the two main actors during the two periods (Figure 23).

Figure 23 The prevalence of the two main actors in the corpus and quota subsample by the lifecycle of origo.hu (% of articles)



While in the corpus Orbán is more or less equally visible during the entire period, he is visible less and less in quota related articles. The life-cycle of Soros is the exact opposite: while in the corpus he is mentioned somewhat more frequently with the passing of time, in the quota subsample he became significantly more visible during the last period compared to his visibility in the corpus in general, even overtaking Orbán himself.

6. Summary

In the cross-national paper of WP5 (Pasetti and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2018) the authors argued that there are two fundamental questions one has to answer to solve the puzzle of the European migration crisis: How to distribute responsibility fairly, and how to harmonize standards on both asylum procedures and reception conditions. The WP5 participants agreed that in order to answer these two questions we need to fine tune our research design. The decision was made to focus on the discourse on relocation quotas since this was an issue relevant in all countries. We assumed that the topic of relocation quotas could be a proper proxy for such a comparative and empirical study since (1) there was an EU wide discussion on it (2) more or less during the same time period (3) based on an EU document as a common point of departure for the discourse. Moreover, this discourse was from the very beginning (1) highly politicized, and (2) in several cases even used as the core issue for debating a much wider array of topics, such as sovereignty, and “more or less Europe.” We argue that as far as this politicization process is concerned Hungary is an extreme case where the issue of relocation quotas became the ultimate propaganda tool of a moral panic generating technique, an essential element of which is the *moral panic button*.

Our use of the term “migration crisis” instead of “refugee crisis” should not be seen as a political statement (i.e. we do not mean to imply that those who came were NOT refugees). We have used both the terms “migrant” and “migration” in a purely technical, neutral sense.

In the comparative analysis Pasetti and Garcés-Mascareñas (2018) showed that there was a short period (from late August to early October 2015, i.e. when the migration crisis culminated) when the prevalence of the quota discourse was extremely high in all eight countries.

The quota discourse became salient in the eight countries only when the intensity of the refugee movement on the Balkan route reached the core areas of the EU. As the comparative analysis very lucidly put it, there were two dynamics causing the high salience of the relocation quota discourse:

“... one related to the power of the media and the other linked to that of the government. The case of Finland well describes the former: here the increasing prevalence about the refugee matter does not take

place at the same time in media and in the parliament. Whereas the parliamentary debates on the relocation quota took place behind the cabinet's closed doors, media debates plainly addressed the matter, thus not only contributing to a growing relevance for the public but also spreading a specific framing. The case of Hungary instead captures the second type of dynamic, in which prevalence of the issue is driven by political discourse" (Pasetti- Garcés-Mascareñas 2018 p. 18).

In our analysis we have argued that in case of Hungary the MPB significantly contributed to the salience and the content of the quota discourse. As to salience, the three high-salience weeks in Hungary overlapped with the intensification of using the MPB: finishing the building of the fence on the Croatian border, and starting the campaign for the quota referendum. The first high-salience day was on the first week of September 2015, which obviously had nothing to do with the EU relocation related declarations but rather with the events on the Hungarian-Serbian border.

6.1 Briefly about the research design and the dataset

To briefly summarize elements of our research design and characteristics of the dataset that might be useful for the Reader,¹⁶ we selected ten sources to represent the Hungarian online media. Five of our selected sources are among those with the largest audience, another five sources consist of three right-wing and two leftist online media outlets with a smaller but very active audience.

We started our analysis on 1 January 2015 because according to the results of a case study (Bernát-Messing, 2016) the Hungarian Prime Minister gave several interviews between January 7 and 11, by which time the discourse on the migration crisis had started. We assume that this was the also the first instance of pressing the MPB by the government to increase their popularity, which had been rapidly decreasing since late 2014 (Sik, 2016, Barlai-Sik, 2016). The ending date of the time-span of our research has been derived from our assumption that the MPB is a long-term form of state propaganda: as the discourse on migration crisis did not end by the disappearance of migrants, we decided to extend our research period to cover the Parliamentary elections of 2018.

We also defined shorter periods within this time-span which could be identified as separate instances of pressing the MPB. The idea was to set the exact date of the campaign events on the basis of identifying their (1) starting and (2) culminating points, i.e. when the MPB button was most likely pressed.

To find the articles that were likely to contain the relevant information, we defined four keywords and selected articles that contained at least one of these keywords. The keywords were constructed to identify the Hungarian equivalents of the following terms: "refugee," "immigrant," "migrant," and "relocation."

6.2 Some characteristics of the discourse on relocation quotas

Comparing the frequency of articles between 1 January 2015 and 14 April 2018, we found that the trends are rather similar. This fits our assumption that in Hungary the quota discourse is embedded into the general discourse on migration issues.

Focusing on the subsample of articles that contain (at least once) the term "relocation quota" (N= 5684), we can analyze the deviations (if any) between the content of the relocation quota discourse and the migration crisis discourse in general. There are several signs that the relocation quota discourse was indeed the core topic of the MPB. Compared to the general discourse on the migration crisis in the corpus:

16 For a more detailed discussion see (Sik-Simonovits, 2019).

- *migration* (and not *refugee*) related terms are strongly associated with the quota discourse, indicating that these terms with negative connotations are the proper ones for the MPB,
- neither in the corpus nor in the quota subsample is Soros mentioned before 2016, but in 2018 his visibility rises significantly faster in the quota subsample than in the corpus. This is a clear sign that the quota discourse and “Soros” were intentionally connected to each other in this period,
- the most often used negative term “illegal”¹⁷ was used more frequently in the quota subsample during two periods (and not for long): first during the campaign of the national consultation on immigration and terrorism, and second during the later anti-Soros and anti-EU campaigns.

6.3 Clusters of the quota discourse

Using a simplified version of cluster analysis, we have illustrated the types of associations among the labels, actors, and organizations. We have used the total sample (corpus) as the benchmark, tested whether there are differences in the clustering processes between the corpus and the quota sub-sample, and have identified special clusters within the quota subsample.

We expected that the within-group variants of the term “migration” and “refugee” are positively correlated to each other, and negatively correlated to those in the other group. The results of the correlation analysis only partially backed up our assumptions: while the within-group correlations were relatively strong, we have only found a negative (and rather low) correlation between the terms “refugee” and “immigration.” Moreover the term “migrant” is positively correlated with two—relatively rarely used—*refugee* related terms. This means that there are no completely segregated discourses on the quota, and that the “language of the MPB” only stochastically differs from the general one.

Using the analysis as a benchmark, our first cluster analysis focused on the actors in the corpus. The result contained three small actor clusters with Orbán as the main actor but having different roles: in the first cluster he was one of the major international players, in the second he is the head of the government, and in the third and largest cluster he acts as the leading figure of Hungarian foreign policy. The cluster (C2, with Orbán as the core actor in domestic politics) was especially prevalent at the beginning of the time-span (before the peak of the migration crisis), i.e. when the MPB was being tested.

In the detailed version of analyzing the quota subsample we have identified four actor clusters, the largest having Soros as the core actor. In this cluster three of the four governmental sources—especially the one directly responsible for state propaganda (magyaridok.hu)—are overrepresented, and the articles are relatively shorter than the average. These two features of the cluster can be related to the dominance of repetitive and short anti-Soros slogans the MPB usually applies. This explanation is supported by the fact that the labels “refugee” and “refugee crisis” are underrepresented in the articles, as if their association with Soros as part of the quota discourse had been intentionally hindered. The trend of this cluster differs from the other three. It culminates in 2017/2018 when the MPB used Soros as the main culprit in various capacities (speculator, importer of immigrants, financing anti-Hungarian NGOs and the CEU, etc.).

In one of the organization clusters of the detailed model in the quota subsample (C4, having Hungarian political parties in its core), the label “refugee” and its related terms are significantly underrepresented, but all *migration* related terms overrepresented, and the presence of “Soros” is much stronger. This combination can be identified as the MPB elements within the quota discourse. In the German politics cluster (C2) articles using the term “refugee” (and terms related to it) were significantly overrepresented, i.e. this cluster is a selection of EU-compatible articles. The prevalence of the five organizational clusters

17 The term illegal was usually used as the epitheton ornans of migration/migrant.

is rather similar during the entire period except for the border/terror cluster (C3)—which is highly salient during the autumn of 2015 (during which time the migration crisis culminated, and the MPB was first used via the national on consultation of immigration and terror)—and except for the domestic cluster (C4) and benchmark cluster (C1), which were more visible around 2017 when MPB was in full use.

6.4 The quota discourse and the MPB

During the time-span of the research two significantly different periods can be isolated: one before and one after the building of the border fence (September 2015). This is because while during the pre-fence period there were large numbers of refugees in Hungary and they were made visible to the public by the then still existing more independent sources, in the post-fence period the refugees were no longer present, and no strong non-governmental media existed anymore. In other words while the pre-fence period (1) because of the visibility of refugees (Boda-Simonovits, 2016) and (2) because of the existence of a more polemical and informative media, the operation of the MPB was somewhat tempered, the balancing effects of these disappeared (or were significantly weakened) in the post-fence period.¹⁸ Consequently we have assumed that the previously identified effects of the MPB will be more visible in the latter period compared to the former one. To illustrate the relevance of these assumptions, we defined two periods: an early one (between 7 January 2015 to 16 September 2015, -4 indicating the first four deciles), and a late one (after 2016, 7- indicating the last four deciles).

The sharp decrease in the use of the term “refugee” (and the almost as sharp increase in the use of the term “migrant”) can be related to repeated instances of pressing the MPB. And since the decrease in the use of the term “refugee” was especially fast in case of the quota discourse, we can conclude that articles focusing on the quota especially rigorously avoided using the term “refugee” as one with potential connotation of solidarity and altruism.

The prevalence of the actor cluster containing articles focusing on Soros is the only cluster with a significant difference between the two periods: in the last (7- deciles) period when the MPB was pressed several times, the prevalence of this cluster skyrocketed.

In another paper (Sik-Simonovits, 2019) we introduced a natural experiment when the ownership of one of our sources (origo.hu) changed. In the beginning of our research time period it was a non-governmental source, but by the end of the period it became a governmental one.

When we analyzed the prevalence of the two most often used labels in the corpus and in the quota subsample, we found that in the course of the organizational shift the use of the label “refugee” decreased more sharply in the quota subsample than in the corpus. In other words, the use of the term “refugee” when the topic is the quota was especially severely restricted after the government’s takeover. This can be interpreted as a lucid illustration of pressing the MPB.

Another telling example of the discursive shift in the course of making a subservient state-dominated puppet out of the previously non-governmental origo.hu, is the change in the visibility of the two main actors during the two periods. While in the corpus Soros is mentioned somewhat more frequently with the passing of time, in the quota subsample he became significantly more visible during the last period compared to his visibility in the corpus in general, even overtaking Orbán himself.

18 During these weeks the level of xenophobia, which has been increasing fast since 2014, has decreased (Sik, 2016).

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8. Glossary

Cluster analysis (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cluster_analysis)

Cluster analysis ... is the task of grouping a set of objects in such a way that objects in the same group (called a cluster) are more similar (in some sense) to each other than to those in other groups (clusters). ... Cluster analysis itself is not one specific algorithm, but the general task to be solved. It can be achieved by various algorithms that differ significantly in their understanding of what constitutes a cluster and how to efficiently find them. Popular notions of clusters include groups with small distances between cluster members, dense areas of the data space, intervals or particular statistical distributions.

Corpus (based on Allen, 2016 p. 23)

Corpus linguistics is an approach to studying language that analyses collections of texts called 'corpora' (singular: corpus) to look for usage patterns, among other aspects, that aren't necessarily apparent when researchers read a small set of articles. ... despite computerized assistance, researchers still can—and arguably must—view how the quantitative patterns exist in context and interpret the significance of them.

Moral panic

A moral panic is the process of arousing social concern over an issue, usually through the work of “moral entrepreneurs” (people initiating the panic create a clear message and set the agenda) and the mass media. This process can be described as intensive fear and a high level of anxiety raised by news transmitted by the mass media. As Cohen defined it the moral panic is a threat to societal values and interests” (Cohen 1972).

Moral panic button (Barlai-Sik, 2016)

The moral panic button is a complex set of state-propaganda techniques. It includes various forms of manipulation such as 'national consultation', the 'quota referendum', Parliamentary election and overlapping waves of billboard, TV, radio spots campaigns. The aim of using the moral panic button is win popularity by framing and manipulating the political discourse in the public sphere. This is a long-term, high-cost manipulation technique which monopolizes all forms of media and reduces the room for maneuver of non-governmental actors. Through this mechanism, citizens can be reached with messages that are tailored by professional framing experts to influence the way they think, feel and behave.

In our case the message is always a refugee crisis related issue (i.e. anti-Soros, anti-UN, anti-EU, anti-civil society, etc.) but with different scapegoats. These targets, however, are framed in a way to form a conspiracy against the Hungarian nation, against which only the government can save the people: „the government is using the moral panic button to build national unity by „creating an enemy image as subject of the moral panic which is perceived as a threat to social values and national interests, thus to moral order.” (Barlai-Sik, *ibid* p. 153)

Natural experiment (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_experiment)

A natural experiment is an empirical study in which individuals (or clusters of individuals) are exposed to the experimental and control conditions that are determined by nature or by other factors outside the control of the investigators. The process governing the exposures arguably resembles random assignment. Thus, natural experiments are observational studies and are not controlled in the traditional sense of a randomized experiment. Natural experiments are most useful when there has been a clearly defined exposure involving a well defined subpopulation (and the absence of exposure in a similar subpopulation) such that changes in outcomes may be plausibly attributed to the exposure.

Appendix The relevant events of the Hungarian migration crisis in 2015 and 2016


Table A1 The milestones of the Hungarian migration crisis in 2015

11 January	The first relevant official statement related to immigration into Hungary: Prime Minister Orbán's speech in Paris after the commemoration ceremony for the victims of the <i>Charlie Hebdo</i> terror attack: economic migration is bad, Hungary will therefore not provide asylum for economic migrants.
April	Preparations begin for the so-called 'national consultation' on immigration initiated by the government (mailing a questionnaire to all Hungarian adults to canvass their opinion on immigration). Increasing number of anti-immigration communiques by politicians in the government.
May	'National consultation' on immigration.
June	Government-sponsored anti-immigration billboard campaign nationwide; a counter campaign is organized by a fringe political party with pro-immigration messages.
25–30 June	The formation of the new voluntary grassroots organizations.
13 July	The Hungarian government starts building a fence along the Hungarian–Serbian border.
5–8 August	The opening of transit zones at railway stations in Budapest with the volunteers and grassroots providing street social work and aid for asylum seekers.
8 August	71 dead migrants are found in a van in Austria close to the Hungarian border, obviously en route from Hungary.
25–29 August	Negotiations are under way about a central transit zone in Verseny Street, Budapest, controlled by the Municipality of Budapest.

end of August – early September	Increasing tensions at the Budapest railway stations, where thousands of asylum seekers are waiting for the opportunity to travel on to Germany. Tensions are increased by the erratic reactions of the Hungarian authorities and the state railway company: at one point no asylum seekers are allowed on the trains leaving for Germany – even those with valid tickets; later it is again possible to get on the trains for a few hours, but then all international trains leaving for Germany are cancelled for a few days; on 3 September a train leaves Budapest Keleti railway station with asylum seekers who were informed that they are heading for Germany; the train, however, is stopped at the Bicske reception camp (Hungary), with asylum seekers feeling cheated and trapped.
3–6 September	Right after the train incident at Bicske on 3 September, asylum seekers at Budapest Keleti railway station set out to walk to Austria along the M1 motorway. In response, the government provides buses to transport the asylum seekers direct to the Austrian border from the motorway and from Keleti station. A statement is made by the head of the Catholic Church in Hungary, Cardinal Peter Erdős, justifying the limited involvement of the church in the crisis, in stark contrast to statements made by the Pope.
8 September	Petra László, a camerawoman for a right-wing Hungarian TV channel, trips refugees running from the police at Röszke (Serbian border).
15–16 September	‘The battle of Röszke’ takes place between police and asylum seekers after the physical and legal closure of the Hungarian–Serbian border. The migration flow heads towards the Hungarian–Croatian border.
17 September	The Hungarian–Serbian border is closed down.
21–23 September	Repercussions of a speech delivered by Prime Minister Orbán, who said ‘the government has given financial support to the NGOs’; the volunteers and grassroots protest, as they have in fact not received any state funds; the prime minister meant only those established charity organizations that were commissioned by the government with providing aid at the Croatian and Austrian borders after 15 September.
16 October	The fence along the Hungarian–Croatian border is completed, the border is closed: the end of the mass inflow of asylum seekers and migrants into Hungary.

Source: Juhász et al, 2016

Figure A1 The daily number of illegal border crossings and the most relevant migration crisis related events (1 January 2015 – 31 November 2015)



Source: Juhász-Molnár (2016)



The research project CEASEVAL (“Evaluation of the Common European Asylum System under Pressure and Recommendations for Further Development”) is an interdisciplinary research project led by the Institute for European studies at Chemnitz University of Technology (TU Chemnitz), funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No 770037.) It brings together 14 partners from European countries aiming to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of the CEAS in terms of its framework and practice and to elaborate new policies by constructing different alternatives of implementing a common European asylum system. On this basis, CEASEVAL will determine which kind of harmonisation (legislative, implementation, etc.) and solidarity is possible and necessary.